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Situationism and Law in Christian Ethics
PAUL JERSILD

t is betraying no secret if one ventures
to say that the law is faring badly in
most current discussions of Christian
ethics. The advent of situation ethics has
brought an extreme polarizing of love and
law, with the result that Christian ethics
is often characterized as an ethic of Jove
in opposition to an ethic of rules or laws.
This polarization has been salutary in its
judgment of moralism and legalism in the
ethical thinking of church people. But it
has also created an oversimplified kind of
antithesis between love and law that leaves
us with an inadequate picture of their relationship in Christian ethics. Attention has
been called to this fact by several writers,
notably James Gustafson in his article,
"Context Versus Principles: A Misplaced
Debate in Christian Ethics." 1 Our pur-

pose in these pages is to focus on the question of law in Christian ethics and consider in what sense we can speak of the
"law of God." This question is raised in
a quite critical manner in situation ethics,
and for that reason we shall discuss the
subject in relation to this approach, and
particularly in relation to the work of
Joseph Fletcher. Our concern is to present
a theological basis for the law- a basis
that is notably lacking in situation ethics
- and seek to clarify the relationship between love and law in the Christian understanding.
To focus on the Gospel as the motivating source of the Christian life is of course
altogether proper. Christian ethics is a
Gospel ethic in that the Gospel not only
gives new life to a person but calls him
to manifest that life in compassionate con1 Ht1N111rrl Th11ologiul Rllflillfll, 58 (April
1965), 171 ff. This anide is reprinted in the se- cern for his neighbor. St. Paul's letter to
ries edited by Dean Peer.man and Manin Many, the Galatians states the keynote of the
Nn, Th110log1 No. 3 (New York: The Mac- Christian life in terms of freedom and the
millan Company, 1966). Gustafson goes on to
say that not only writers associated with con- Spirit-filled life bestowed by the Gospel,
textualism but also those who are placed under and such a life he understands in contrast
the "principles" side of the debate differ signifi- to life lived under law. However, the
cantly among themselves, and that this casting
of the issue as one of "situation" versus "prin- motif of judgment associated with God's
ciples" forces an unfair polarization of two di- demanding will cannot be removed from
mensions that are in fact necessarily brought toan understanding of the Christian life
gether in making ethical judgments. See his
without flattening the significance of that
article, "Moral Discernment in the Christian
Life," Nom, .ul CtmlllXI m Christum Blhies, Gospel The reality of Gospel after all is
Gene Outb and Paul Ramsey, eds. (New conveyed just as emphatically in the conYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 17
cept of forgiveness as it is in the concept
10 36.
of love. Forgiveness as the radical action
Th. 11111bor, 11Jho form1rl, lllllghl in 1h, of God that restores a man to his rightful
nUgio,, J.t,,,,,1mn1 of L#lh,r Coll.g,, D1eor•b, lOt.lNI, bt,s r•enll'} joined 1b, Gt-t:ul1""1 self, making all things new, is at the core
Th,olon Pll&#lly of Sllinl Xll1liff CoU.g, in of Christian life. And such a concept,
which brings out the existential signifiChiugo, IU.
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cance of the Gospel, is based on the supposition that God holds man to account,
confronting him in judgment as well as in
love. This means that the concept of law
bas an imponant role to play in understanding the Christian life, a role that fails
to come to expression in situation ethics.
One imponant factor in accounting for
this negative stance toward law is the theology and ethics of Karl Banh, a prominent figure in the development of situation
ethics. Barth makes a dichotomy between
the law of man and the law of God, the
latter being derived exclusively from Jesus
Christ, who constitutes both the law and
Gospel of God.2 laws of society have no
relation to God's law but stand as human
inventions. God's law in Christ is the
hortatory form of the Gospel, and as such
it lays a joyful, salutary claim on us, for
it is a claim already fulfilled by Jesus
Christ. The law of man, on the other
hand, confronts man with the demand that
he satisfy it and constitutes a burden for
him as well as a temptation to self-righteousness. Luther's order of law-Gospel is
reversed, because God does not confront us
in the demands of life prior to or apart
from the Gospel. This view is implicit in
Fletcher's work S"11ation E1hics.8 It is a
Gospel ethic of love that in a radical manner displaces the laws of men, which bear
no relation to the will of God but stand as
buman generali2ations that possess no imperative charaaer in themselves. ''Love is
2 See Karl Barth, "Gospel and Law," .in
Commrmil1, SIM, tfflll Ch•rch: Tm• Bss111s,
ed. Will Herberg (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 71-100, and Ch•rcl,
Dogmdlics, II, 2 (Edinburg: T. & T. Clark,
1957), ch. 8.
I Jo,eph Pletther, Sil#illitm Bll,;u (Philadelphia: The Wesrminster Prea, 1966).
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the only norm" • means that moral obligation derives exclusively from the Gospel,
not from the law. God is operative in love
but not in law.
In addition to this historical-theological
factor, the situationist's aitique of law
.finds support in the character of law itself.
laws are applicable to the universal, "abstractable" dimensions of the moral situation but incapable of dealing with the
uniqueness inherent in every situation because of the uniqueness of individuals and
their relationships to each other. Historically the situationist sees the ethics of
Christianity as having been predominantly
an ethic of law or of absolute rules, that is,
principles that are both categorical and
universally valid. But the situation, be says,
is never universal; it is particular and must
be dealt with in all its particularity. Consequently the use of law in any prescriptive
sense becomes impossible if one is guided
by the situation in arriving at moral decisions. The "antilaw" bias is seen quite
clearly in the writings of Fletcher, where
any adherence to law other than his own
quite provisional use of it is seen as legalism. In a typical oversimpli.6cation he
maintains that there are "only three alternative routes" in making moral decisions:
the legalistic, the antinomian, md the situational.11 This relegates into the legalist
camp anyone who affirms that rules of
behavior can bear more weight than what
is implied in Fletcher's view of them as
"generalizations" or "illuminators" that
" See cbapcer 4 of Silllllliotl Blbics.
G Sillllllio• Blbics, p. 17. The same claim is
made by the lace James Pike in his book, Yo•
.,J lh• Nn, Moulil1 (New York: Haper and
Row, 1967), p.4, where he calalogs all edlia
u either leplisric (''Code ethia"), anriaommn.
or

msa:ntial.
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may or may not possibly help us in facing
moral decision.
Without denying the important insights
of situation ethics, the whole thrust of this
approach makes evident the need of developing a strong theologically based understanding of the law. Too easily the law
becomes the whipping boy in the attempt
to counteraa legalism within the church,
but we dare not treat it in such a cavalier
fashion. The profundity of this concept is
to be seen in relation to the first article of
the Creed, which plays no discernible role
in situation ethics. Fletcher maintains that
there are two approaches to a theological
defense of law: the Roman Catholic advocacy of natural law and the Protestant
attempt to derive in literalistic fashion
a set of rules from Scripture.8 He understands both as attempts to arrive at a set
of commandments that are universally
valid, and he rejects both of them as expressions of legalism.
There are other resources within the
Reformation tradition, however, from
which an understanding of law can be
gained. Insights of Reformation theology
provide a viable understanding of law in
the conten of the providential sovereignty
of God and can provide a meaningful picture of the charaaer of human life that is
lived under and claimed by that sovereignty. No consideration of the Gospel
or the Christian life is adequate that does
not perceive it within this larger context
of divine sovereignty, or the context of law.

• • •
Out of the Reformation tradition, and
1 Silwlio,, Blhia, pp.

21 and 75 ff. P1etcbu
deals with Anglican auempts at • aaaual Jaw
ethic in cb. 4 of Mor.l R•sfJOfUibilily (Phila-

delphia: The WesraJiosrer Press, 1967).

quite decisively in the theology of Martin
Luther, we see the conviction that God
speaks to man in two ways, through law
and Gospel. In regard to the law, this is
to say that the reality of the divine Presence impinges on human life in one's experience of being held, to account ( Rom.
3: 19) for what one does and who one is
in his relation to other human beings and
the world about him. Man cannot live
without life calling him to account. He
is responsible to himself for what he
does to his life, as well as responsible to
those whose lives his own touches in the
variety of r_elationships that existence
thrusts upon him. His accountability is but
the other side of his freedom. Because man
is free, his actions and - in a larger sense
- his life constitute the response he makes
in his freedom to the world in which he
lives. His freedom and therein the necessity to f'esponrl to life is that which is given
and cannot be evaded.
We might call this understanding of
God's law the "law of life," by which we
mean simply that life confronts us with
a multitude of demands and obligations
that compel us to respond in our freedom.
That response can be responsible or i"espomible, it can lead to the enlarging and
uplifting of one's life and the enhancement
of one's freedom, or it can have a desuuctive effea on one's life as well as the lives
of others and resuia rather than enhance
one's freedom. What one has tlone, what
one has been, is decisive for the possibilities of response in the present and future.
The Scriptural diawn '"What a man sows,
that shall he also reap" brings out this character of life. The law of life holds us to
our past and restticts our freedom-sometimes quite painfully- in dealing .respon-
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sibly in the present. In calling us to account, the law of life indicts us in our loss
of integrity. The Christian reads the demands of life as the means by which God
speaks to man, calling him to account and
therein calling him to himself as the ethical question raises the issue of life's meaning and the possibility of responsible selfhood.

That understanding of God who confronts us in the demands and obligations
that life imposes on us finds no place
among proponents of siruation ethia.
Their understanding of law is exclusively
in terms of prescribed rules of conduct,
and their primary interest is to contrast
an ethic based on such principles with the
siruational charaaer of Christian ethia.•
This definition of God's law as the law In his book Chnslum Morals Totldy, John
of life is a definition of law not in terms A. T. Robinson reveals more appreciation
of content but in terms of the effect that than is typical among situationists for the
law has on one's life. Gerhard Ebeling importance of law in the sense of codes of
points out that this is Luther's position as behavior that form a "net" or framework
10
he develops it in his understanding of the of condua that provides social order.
conscience.7 Law is experienced in the Bue his understanding of such codes reclaim that our conscience places on us in ceives no theological support, and the
response to the demands of life. It is not emphasis lies on love as the opposite pole
a matter of the conscience perceiving what to law. This opposition of love to law is
is right and what is wrong, giving us carried to such an extreme by situationists
knowledge of God's law in the sense of that the God of the Gospel is separated
a specific imperative for each occasion. It from the world of human ethical reflection,
was not used by Luther in this sense. For which seeks to come to terms with the
him, man's response to the law of life is ethical demands of life. As in the case of
not in terms of knowitJg it but hearing it command that is transmitted duougb them and
What men will regard the content of the that he sees as involving the self-aftirmadoa of
law to be will differ from time to time and our essential being. The demand of life, amsmined in codes of behavior, calls us ••10 ourplace to place, but the function of the selves," and this is an uacoadidoaal call.
conscience for Luther is seen in the claim
o Paul Lehmann eschews any reference ro
the
will of God in which it is uadersrood as
that life makes on us and the question of
"pieceptual" (see his Blhiu ill II Clmslio Co,,one's life that is inherent in such a claim: ,.,a [New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp.
"Where do you stand?" 8
77-78). He speaks of the divine aaivic, in

Gerhard Ebeling, Wortl lltlll Ptdlh (Philadelphia: Ponress Press, 1963), pp. 277-78.
Barthiaa
See also his 'Theology and the Evideatness
of
the Ethical," Trt111Sl.ling Thealog1 inlo lh•
Modun lfg•, Vol. II of /a•rndl for Th•alog1
tlllll th• ChNreh, Robert W. Funk, ed. (New
York: Harper and Row, 1965).
8 In Th.alog1 lltlll CIIIIIM (New York: Osford University Press, 1959), pp. 135 lf., Paul
Tillich makes a similar point in bis distinction
between the conditioned contents of various SJSu:ms of morality unconditioaal
and the
moial
7
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the
. world
__ ___.in• the"hcoatex:t••of
_..,,polida, where God
••
11rn•a111116 man, an actl91Cf
euaaa""" 10
that 1-cbrn•aa uaderscaads as IOleriologic:al. In
fashion
he celescopes the acdvic, of
God that we have designated as Jaw into that
activity we call GospeL This means that the.re
is no room for uaderscaadiag the aaivic, of
God in the demands of life that IIUlcl behind
the mon.l wisdom of IC>cieCJ a embodied in her
Jaws and priac:iples of conduct.
10 J. A. T. IlobiDIOII, Chrislia MOWJJJ Ta(Philadelphia: The Wesaniasw Press.
1964), p. 12.
11

u,
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Barth, the activity of God is understood
exclusively in terms of the Gospel, and that
means a dichotomy between man's demands (law) and God's demands (Gospel), so that the two are not properly
related. The Gospel imperative to love
is not understood as the fulfillment of
what life demands of us but is seen only
as the polar opposite to all activity carried out according to law.11

• • •
Io speaking of law over against the
Gospel we have been referring to the "demands of life" and the experience all men
encounter of being held to account in their
relations to their neighbor ( wife or husband, children, creditor, employer, person
next door) as well as corporate society
(institutions, city, nation). When one
moves from the law as demand to positive
laws- the codified laws of society- as
well as to specific principles and rules of
conduct that are part of the ethos of one's
society, then a problem arises as to whether
one can identify all such laws and rules
11 While rejecting the Barthian critique of
the law-Gospel dialectic in Lutheran theology,
we do not deny the validity of critical evaluations of Luther's position that point out the
antithesis this schema implies in the nature of
God Himself and His governance of the world.
Both the law and the Gospel as well as its correlative teaching of the two kingdoms are in
danger of being used as hardened formulas that
overlook the unity of the Christian view of God
as Creator, Redeemer, and Perfecter of His
world. We would stress the providential character of the law, which calls man to himself,
u well u the fact that love is the fulfillment of
die law, not just the antithesis of law. The sovereignty of God expresses itself in both demand
and promise, judgment and redemption, and the
drama of this dialectic is enacted throughout
the breadth and depth of human experience,
and is not subject to being nearly capsulized or
limicm in any given formula.

Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1969

of conduct as mirroring the demands of
life and thereby embodying responsible
action before God. The racial struggle in
our own country provides but one example
of the fact that law is often the tool of
a group within society that uses the law
to maintain its position of supremacy and
power, thus using the law to enforce an
unjust rather than a just order of society.
Can we speak of such laws as reflecting the
divine demand? Obviously we cannot, and
sooner or later it is discernible whether
a given Jaw is in face serving the cause of
justice and order or whether it is a means
of perpetuating an injustice against a less
privileged group. In such cases one can
maintain, together with proponents of
nonviolent resistance, that in the name of
justice and human integrity we must resist
the implementation of such laws in a way
that demonstrates respect for law and the
true intent of law. Man's laws as well as
man himself stand under the sovereignty
of God, which means that man's laws as
well as man himself are subject to divine
judgment.
The words of Jesus "Do unto others as
you would have them do to you" can be
regarded as a summation of what life demands of us and consequently the criterion
by which rules of conduct can be judged.
However, what "you would have them do
to you" in given situations in different cultures is not a uniform matter; we find
variety as to what constitutes moral obligation from one society to another. This
variety becomes obvious as one moves from
general principles, which are abstract in
character, to the realm of casuistry. The
common humanity of man is mirrored in
the general applicability of such commandments as those, for example, in the Second

5
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Table of the Ten Commandments,12 which
mirror "tbe facts of life" in prohibiting
those kinds of actions that would ultimately destroy rather than further the life
of the community. As one moves down the
ladder from general principle to specific
applications of it in concrete situations, the
influence of the particular culture with its
understanding of God and man and the
structure of its social order take on increased importance in shaping what constitutes acceptable action. Speaking of the
"law of God" as we have done here thus
does not mean that we may expect co find
uniformity in the rules of conduce from
one society to another. The demands of
life can be understood and codified in
a variety of ways.13

697

Furthermore, our concern co give a theological basis to the Jaws of society cannot
be understood as endowing every rule of
conduct or even certain particular ones
with the sanctity of "God's will" in such
a manner that they are regarded as "absolutes" in the sense of being unbreakable.
Laws and principles are man's response in

meeting the demands of life, and their
obligatory character rests in their effectiveness in meeting that demand and directing
him to a course of action that furthers
a just order and enhances the welfare of
his fellowmen. It may be that in given
situations a rule of conduct must be taken
absolutely seriously- that is, treated as
absolutely unbreakable - in order to ensure a responsible course of aaion. But
one cannot discuss the question whether
there are "absolutes" in a theoretical fashion, as is usually done. We agree with
Fletcher when he says: "Our obligation is
relative lo the situation, but obligation in
the situation is absolute." H We disagree
with the inference he makes from this faa,
namely, chat the situation beslows upon
rules of conduct their imperative and normative character. This implies an atomized
view of life that follows quite logically
from stressing the uniqueness of each situation. It is as though we jump from
situation to situation with no imperatives
to guide us except as one may arise out
of a situation.115 Situationism drains pre-

12 In his E1hies (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1962), p. 305, Boohoelfer speaks of
the "providential congruity ber:ween the contents
of the second table and the inherent law of
historical life itself."
18 Many of the "natural Jaw" theories have
merit in recognizing what we would call the
"common humanity" of man but invariably suffer by proceeding on the basis of premises that
are so broad concerning this "nature of man"
that the consequences entailed by the premises
cannot be reconciled with the variety and complexity of human conduct. The Reformation
concept of "orders of creation" also seeks to
illumine the structures of life but is in danser
of being understOOd in too static a fashion or
even in such a way as to give divine sanction
to a particular social, political, and economic
order. See Bonhoelfer's discussion in 1!1hies,
pp.254ff.

H SilN11lion 1!1hies, p. 27. Such a statement
as this poses a difficulty that is common in Fletcher's work, which suffers from a lack of careful statement. Does he mean here that there are
rules of condua that become absolute in the
situation (the
would so indicate), or
is he speaking simply of love, which is his only
absolute? He is not willing to idendfy love
with the intent of law, so it annot be both.
1G This feature of discontinuity in Christian
ethia, which is present whenever the singular
character of each historical moment is emphasized, is criticized by Doua}as Sturm in bis
article, ''Naturalism, HiJtoricism, and Christian
Ethia: Toward a Christian Doctrine of Natural
law," in Th• Jo11r1Ull of R•li&ion (Chicago:
University of Chica&O Press, Janual:J 1964). and
ieprinted in Nw, ThHloa No. 2, Martin
(New eds.
York:
Marty and Dean Peerman,
The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 77-96.
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cisely that imperative or obligatory character from rules that enables them to serve
effectively as guidelines in anticipating and
shaping a situation in which moral decision is called for.
Fletcher distinguishes between two different ways in which law is understood.
On the one hand it is regarded as an absolute that should never be broken, and on
the other hand it can be regarded as an
empirical generalization with no inherent
imperative quality.18 The situationist rejects the first understanding and adopts the
second, with the result that ethical principles are regarded as "cautious generalizations" that possess value in providing
guidelines for behavior but do not carry
imperative force in themselves. This twofold understanding is an oversimplification,
because it does not in fact mirror the way
in which ethical rules or principles function. One can discern a third point of
view in our attitude roward the law, which
stands between the two "extremes" defined
by Fletcher, of law as either an "absolute"
Sturm poina out the necessity of continuity and
structure in Christian ethia and defines the

Christian view of love as the natural law of bu.man action, a permanent, immucable principle

of action that takes full account of the uansient
and the particular. Oar concern is to iecognize
the demand of God that is implicit in the historical and the changing, and to relate the
Christian view of love to that demand as the
fulfillment of what Goel requires of us.
l l Pletcher distinguishes unons law, rule,
and principle. He defines laws and rules as imperatives that are .regarded as universally applicable and absolute in cbarac:ter, while principles are usable as guidelines that may or may
aot be helpful to us in a given situation. Since
be mainwm that the only law is the law of
love, all the "thou shalt nots" of society be
would define u principles, not possessfog the
cbanaer of an imperative. See Smlldio,, Blbiu,
PP.3Hf.

or a "maxim." This viewpoint recognizes
the Jaw as an im,pernli11e for which too
much is claimed if it is regarded as an
"absolute" in every instance, but for which
too little is claimed if it is seen only as
a "maxim" or "generalization" that may be
helpful as a guideline. Such rules of behavior, for example, as "You shall not lie"
or ''You shall not commit adultery" or
"You shall not steal" express obligations
that reflect the character of community life
and the demands it places on us in our
relationship with our neighbor. These rules
bear an imperative quality because they
reflect the claim our neighbor makes on
us in virtue of his humanity. To refuse
to recognize such rules as bearing imperative force is to refuse to take my neighbor
seriously, for the rule embodies the right
of my neighbor over against myself, just
as it embodies my right over against him.
Each of the above prohibitions mirrors a
claim that each man makes on his neighbor, that his right to the truth, to his wife,
or to his property not be violated.
It is necessary then to make the distinction that situationists do not make, between "imperatives" and "absolutes." In
moving from rule as "cautious generalization" to rule as categorical imperative with
absolute validity at all times and places,
the situationist rules out the possibility of
recognizing rules that bear an imperative
quality because they reB.ect a claim that
our neighbor or a larger unit of society
may have on us. This fact can be recognized without calling such imperatives "absolutes," a word that has muddied the
waters in this debate. There may be many
Christians, as Pletcher maintains, who
"hang on to certain eternally invariable
rules of conduct as absolutely valid and
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universally obliging regardless of the situation," 17 but it would be difficult to find
a student of Christian ethics who would
deny that the situation or context has
a bearing on the application of rules of
conduct. This does not mean, however,
that rules do not possess an imperative
force that compels one to heed them. It
may be- it will always be debatablethat ''You shall not kill" is to be understood as an "absolute," that is, it is not and
never can be a morally responsible act to
take the life of another, whatever the circumstance. Most Christians, however,
would allow for exceptions to this rule,
but this does not mean that the rule serves
as no more than a maxim for our behavior.
"You shall not kill" carries imperative
force, it obUgales us to heed the personhood of our neighbor. It is not a rule that
we can choose to heed or not to heed in
the sense that we are fully sovereign over
the rule. Rather, if the circumstance leads
us to take a life as the only alternative open
to us in carrying out a morally responsible
act-say, to defend our children from an
intruder-what we do bears an "in spite
of' charaaer. The necessity of taking a
life does not, in other words, deny the
claim that my neighbor has on me that his
life is not mine to take. Whether one is
arguing euthanasia or the right of self.
defense, this assumption is fundamental.
It should thus be dear that to insist on
the imperative character of general rules
of condua that enhance the welfare of
society and whose validity is not bestowed
or cancelled by the situation, we do not
mean that the situation has no bearing on
lT In his "Rdectioa and Reply," in Tb•
Sil•lllio# Blbks D•btlu, Harvey Cox, ed. (Philadelphia: The WesaniDSler Press, 1968), p. 2,0.
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the moral decision one makes. Nor is it
right to infer from this position that moral
decision on the pan of the Christian is
simply a matter of reacting to burdensome
pressures of obligation. That which distinguishes the Christian's own self-awareness and his own stance in life is the face
that the sovereignty of God is expressed
not only in the calling of men to account
for their lives but in the redemptive act
of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus
Christ. All of life is now recognized by the
Christian as beating the imprint of the
cross, calling him to the discipleship of
freedom, which pattern is seen in the life
of Christ. Thus life confronts the Christian
in terms of law and Gospel, judgment and
redemption, and in his own moral response
co life this dialectic is both expressed and
experienced continuously.

• • •
Though law as the demands of life
stands in antithesis to Gospel in its calling
man to account and beating an implicit
judgment on man in his failure to live responsibly, the dialectical reladonship of
law to Gospel is seen in the fact that law
i1 also fulfilled by the Gospel This means
that the law of God as life's demands looks
for that response in man which the Gospel
bescows: faith in God and love of one's
neighbor in the freedom which that faith
inspires. Man attempts co live responsibly
in light of the law of life by aeating a social order in which justice shall rule
through man's responsible use of his freedom. But that kind of life in freedom is
first realized where there is love, which
casts out fear and which enables one to
be something for his neighbor. From a
Christian perspective then, the intent of
the law is fulfilled in that love which seeks

8
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the welfare of one's neighbor.18 The exhortation to love that is implicit in the
Gospel is not to be identified with tbe
Jaw's demand, for it is based on the redemptive act of God in Jesus Christ and
finds its motivation in that event; and yet
the exhortation to love does fulfill what
the law demands of us. Because the Christian knows God as the Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ, he understands the character
of the responsible life to be more than
observing "the letter of the law," which is
the minimal concern to satisfy the external
demands of moral obligation. On the contrary, he can now interpret the law as directives that point him to the needs of his
neighbor. The Golden Rule, which we
noted above as a summary of what life
demands of us, becomes for the Christian
a commandment to love. This Christian
understanding of the Jaw is beautifully
illustrated in Luther's Tf'eame on Good
W o,ks, where the negative prohibition of
each commandment becomes a positive
direaive for serving one's neighbor.19
The fact that the intent of the law is
fulfilled by the Gospel exhortation to love
means that we cannot divorce Jaw from
love in the either/or fashion that is popular among exponents of situation ethics.
The common practice of situationists is to
construct cases where general principles
of conduct stand in the way of responding
to the needs of one's neighbor in a spirit
of "'gape.20 In this way the inadequacy of
18 Gal. 5:14i R.om.13:8-l0i Matt. 22:34-40
and parallel verses.
19 Woris of M11r1in Llllhn (Philadelphia:
A. J. Holman, 1915), I, 184Jf.
20 Joseph Pletcher is highly adept at
doing
thiL See Paul Ramsey, D••tls .,,,J Rtd.s m
Chris,;. Blhks (New York: Charles Scribner's

rules of conduct is made clear, and the
alternative to acting according to rules is
tc act out of love for one's neighbor. Is it
not more accurate to place the conflict between law and love in the kind of motive
one has in carrying out an ethical action
rather than as a conflict between what is
actually done? Agape leads one to act nol
becmese of the law but because of his
neighbor's need. The distinction here between acting according to the law and acting out of love is the distinction between
carrying out the law for the sake of the
law, which is legalism, or for the sake of
the neighbor, which is to act in love. The
situationist would rather understand the
conflict between law and love to be one
that requires the pretting aside of tbe Jaw
in order that one might act in love. It is
quite true that love may often lead a person to go beyond what people think is
required of him, but this is not rejecting
or putting aside the obligation of the law.
To put aside moral principles generally involves a situation so dire that few of us
will ever likely find ourselves in it. The
cases that Fletcher cites to demonstrate the
conflict between law and love more often
than not demonstrate this point as well.
What impresses one about Fletcher's cases
is that they are intended to give us a "slice
of life," real human situations that cannot
be subsumed under the law, when actually
they are classic examples of highly unusual
situations such as the mother who must
have herself impregnated to gain liberty
from a concentration camp, or the seaman
who must throw his fellow sailors overboard in order to save the women and
children in an overcrowded lifeboat. In
Sons, 1967), ch. 7: "The Case of Joseph
Pletcher and Joseph Fletcher's Cases."
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any event, his citing of exceptions to a
moral rule does not disprove the general
validity of the rule or the fact that it bears
an imperative character but rather calls
into question a slavish or legalistic adherence to it without reference to the situation.
To sum up our argument, we have maintained that the sovereignty of God, which
calls man to account, is mirrored in the
l:iw and rules of conduct of a society, whose
function is to serve that society by maintaining a just order in which the rights of
men, however defined by that society, are
protected. We bave claims over against
one another, and in acting responsibly in
light of those claims we are acting responsibly before God. This is to say that
God confronts us in the.law as well as in
the Gospel, in the obligations of life as
well as in the experience of grace and forgiveness. The demands of life embodied
in the law not only stand over against the

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/65
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Gospel message in their inherent judgment of man in his refusal to live responsibly; they also find a fulfillment in the
Gospel in that the wholeness and integrity
of life that is demanded of us is bestowed
by the Gospel through forgiveness. This
Gospel in turn bears the exhortation to
love as we have been loved, and this agap,
love is the Christian's response in seeking
to meet the claims that his neighbor places
on him. Love may put aside a given law,
but only where it stands in the way of
achieving the law's intent of a just social
order. Situation ethics in effect identifies
God with the Gospel but removes Him
from the law, and consequently removes
Him from the moral wisdom of society.
Its polemic against mies fails to recognize
the imperative cbaraaer of commandments
that mirror the demands that life places
on us - the "unrecognized demand of
God."

Chicago, Ill.
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